Verdun 105 (8): The Price of Glory

It was with excited anticipation that I began reading Horne’s account of Verdun. This, original English-language account of the 8–10 month battle, was the third that I have read simply because of the order in which I had books available. I expected that it would be a case of “best for last”, not to belittle the excellent and valuable works of Kaufmann and Kaufmann and Buckingham, but Horne’s version comes highly recommended. In fact, the authors of the other books state the influence of Horne’s work and how much they admire it. I now realise that Buckingham’s “Verdun 1916” is effectively an expanded version of “The Price of Glory”, thus paying ultimate homage and respect to this classic book.

Indeed, ‘classic’ is the best description of "The Price of Glory". It is a riveting, moving and evocative account, that transports you to the horror, unimaginable suffering and unfathomable waste that was Verdun.

Horne begins with the importance of Verdun, touching on its ancient heritage, but particularly the experience of the Franco-Prussian war. This military disaster set French strategy and military thinking for the coming conflict that seemed only a matter of time, and indeed was desired by those seeking ‘revanche’. He contrasts the French approach with that of the Germans. The chapter concludes with the story of the sycophantic generals around the Kaiser who ensured that he won during wargames “…with a magnificent encirclement of the enemy”, thus adding to the perception of this as superior strategy.

We move quickly to the eve of Verdun. After the failed and costly attacks of 1915, Joffre called a conference at which “..it was agreed that 1915 should be repeated, but this time on a far bigger scale, with the British and French efforts linked, astride the Somme. The plan was a simple and unimaginative one, which appealed to the mind of Haig, the new British commander” (p. 29). Horne’s assessment of the senior commanders is none too complementary. Joffre and Falkenhayn (and by comparison Haig). All three had neither studied military history nor strategy. Joffre is painted as being of particularly simple intellect, jealous of his power, but unflappable. ”To sum up on Joffre, it might be said that the war was very nearly lost with him, but that it would almost certainly have been lost without him” (p. 24). Like Haig, Joffre did not want to visit troops as he did not want to be confronted by casualties, saying that if he did he could not order the attacks. Falkenhayn, Horne tells us, was even less moved by casualty lists than Joffre or Haig.

Falkenhayn; the enigma. Horne dedicates a chapter to the German chief of general staff. He emerges as a mixture of detached aloofness, cautiousness and ruthlessness. Falkenhayn was able to use his favoured position with the Kaiser and to work the latter as he needed to (Horne relates how the Kaiser did not wish to hear bad news from the front and so was only allowed to hear of episodes of trench heroics by his troops). In seeking approval for what became Operation Gericht, Falkenhayn was able to play to the Kaiser’s hatred of the English (derived from hatred of his English mother, blaming an English ‘quack’ for the death of his father and plans being obstructed by the Royal Navy), while focussing the attack on the major partner of the coalition, France. The details of the plan for the Verdun campaign, even down to the date of the meeting between Falkenhayn and the Kaiser, are uncertain and unknown. Falkenhayn’s true aims in devising the attack are mired in the lack of contemporary reports, minutes and memoranda, mixed with the later-written memoirs of the key participants. Horne’s account clearly demonstrates the confusion, often caused by Falkenhayn’s own words. It certainly seems that the capture of Verdun was not the intended outcome as the attack was limited to the east bank of the Meuse and “… at least one-third of the total available German reserves must be kept in hand to meet the relief counter-offensives the Allies were certain to launch…” (p. 39). Falkenhayn commented to General von Kuhl (Chief of Staff of the Sixth Army) that “…he hoped the expected Allied ripostes, when repulsed, would ‘bring movement into the war once again.’ When this was relayed to the Commander of the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, he commented that ‘General von Falkenhayn was himself not clear as to what he really wanted, and was waiting for a stroke of luck that would lead to a favourable solution.’ Such was the confusion Falkenhayn created about his own intentions” (p. 39). Hardly a rock-solid plan for the great German offensive of 1916.

The early days of the offensive were particularly perilous for the French and Joffre (again) does not come out well. With his inflexible routine he was more interested in his reputation and especially food! He is painted by Horne as a most uninspiring and self-serving individual. When, on 23rd February the situation at Verdun was looking bleak and “…even after percolating the softening filters of G.Q.G (grand quartier general), the reports sounded bad…” (p. 125) Joffre did not proceed to the front to determine for himself, nor immediately send a representative, but it was at the initiative of de Castelnau that the latter sought to go to the front. While the true details are not known for sure, lost with key people who died and in the mists of later justification, it seems in keeping with character and reputation that Joffre remained at headquarters so as not to lose his “…legend of imperturbability, upon which so much had been built…” (p. 126).

By contrast, de Castelnau, Joffre’s right hand man, is one of the few senior commanders who is painted in a positive light; in fact, near-glowing terms when contrasted with his contemporaries! Horne tells us that he “…plunged into the work of re-animating the defence. …a transformation took place that was, by all accounts, miraculous” (p. 129). He determined that an effective defence could be mounted on the right bank (of the Meuse) as well as the left and, most importantly, placed General Pétain in command of forces on both sides of the river. In hindsight, as Horne notes, this played into the hands of Falkenhayn’s (purported) aim of ‘bleeding the French army white’, but it also averted defeat and prevented the shock to national morale that would have in all likelihood occurred if Verdun had been lost.

What of Pétain? Somewhat reminiscent of ‘unconditional surrender’ Grant, Pétain was on his way to obscurity but came to prominence in the cauldron of war (though of a different bent when it came to military theory and with a different personal vice). His rise was not through favour nor patronage, certainly nor from obsequiousness (in fact quite the opposite), but due to his actions and leadership. “…Pétain, unlike most of the other First War Commanders—and in opposition to de Castelnau, then his immediate superior—knew when to stop, instead of trying to redeem failure fruitlessly, and at terrible cost in lives. All the time Pétain was learning with a rapidity almost unique among his fellows, and with an adaptability rare for his age” (p. 137). [Chalk one up for advancement by merit as opposed to ‘born to rule’ or, worse still, time in the seat!] We hear that while Pétain was formal and somewhat aloof with his fellow officers he showed genuine interest in the welfare of the men “…he knew—unlike Haig or Joffre—very well what wounded men looked like” (p. 139), yet “… this uniquely humanitarian general would be called upon to subject the men under his command to what was shortly to become the most inhuman conflict of the whole war” (p. 141). I am left with the impression of a complex character with genuine, positive traits and real, human flaws. It is not often that one finds humour in accounts of the First World War, but Horne’s retelling of Pétain’s chief of staff seeking out his master, at a Paris hotel, to alert him of his summons to Joffre’s headquarters to be appointed to command at Verdun had me laughing heartily and aloud.

The book is not all about the ‘key men’. In a clever literary effect Horne uses the time between the original, planned German offensive and the first day of Verdun to tell us about the troops in the frontlines and the conditions in the trenches and stollen. Surprisingly, he writes, that it was the French who had the greatest hierarchy between men and officers, which was accentuated when sergeants and adjutants replaced the fallen officers following the bloody battles of 1914. There was, writes Horne, an ‘acceptance’ of the conditions. “For every individual who tortured himself trying to think out a reason for life under these conditions, there were ten who dumbly, helplessly and unreflectingly accepted it as it was. … Physically and morally, both the French and the Germans had become toughened to the act of acceptance…  Like steep that has been hard and tensile, but not yet brittle, no longer the green enthusiasts of 1914, nor yet the battle-weary veterans of 1917–18. Verdun was to be the watershed; beyond it neither army would be quite the same again” (pp. 67–68).

Horne’s account of the battle is detailed, describing the developments initially a day at a time, then in terms of each major development. In each case we are taken ‘into the trenches’ with the action and decisions of the company, battalion and divisional commanders. He is a master story-teller who writes vivid prose, as this summary of the first day of the battle will help to illustrate:

“Throughout the line the first day of battle had been for the French one of minor disasters alternating with countless, unrecorded small Thermopylaes. Wherever the German flamethrowers made their hideous debut, panic had occurred; in the Bois d’Haumont, an officer and thirty-six men had surrendered to one flamethrower detachment alone. But, for the most part, the Thermopylaes had the day. The line had held” (p. 82).

Horne’s description of the capture of Fort Douaumont is a superb piece of story telling. Using the detailed account written by von Klüfer, commanding officer of the battalion of the 24th Brandenburgers involved in the capture, that was eventually published just prior to the Second World War, Horne takes us along with the German soldiers approaching the fort, drawn to it as if by an ‘irresistibly enticing’ force and then inside as the dramatic, and at times even comedic, drama unfolds. The chapter relating these remarkable events begins with the clearest and easiest-to-follow plan and description of the fort of the three accounts that I have read so far—not that the others did a bad job, it’s just that Horne’s is quite excellent.

By June the German 420 mm howitzers had exceeded the manufacturer’s specifications for the number of firings. Think about that for a while. They had fired so many shells, in four months, that they exceeded the life-time expectations of the manufacturer. Frightening. It is little wonder really when, for example, prior to the German attack that eventually captured Fort Vaux “…according to Raynal [the French commander of the garrison], shells were falling on the small area of the fort at the rate of 1 500 to 2 000 an hour” (p. 254). Furthermore, Horne tells us that the effectiveness of the 420 mm ‘Big Bertha’ howitzers was reduced as they had been losing the ‘David v Goliath’ battle with the smaller, French 155 mm guns. They “… were exceedingly vulnerable because of their inflexibility, the hugeness of their ammunition stockpiles, and their short range that forced them to come perilously close to the front. One by one they were knocked out… in June the Fifth Army possessed only four worn-out ‘Big Berthas’ out of the original thirteen of the previous February” (p. 248).

As the battle became a symbol of national pride and even, Horne suggests, virility, the lot of the combatants deteriorated further. “In man’s affairs no situation is more lethal than when an issue assumes the status of a symbol. … But, to the men actually engaged in it, a less noble form of symbolism was apparent. … the fighting reached a higher peak of brutality and desperation. The battle seemed to have somehow rid itself of all human direction and now continued through its own impetus. … In the diaries and journals of the time, on both sides, mention of the vileness of the enemy becomes more and more infrequent… The battle itself had become the abhorred enemy” (pp. 242–243).

There have been many last stands in the annals of military history. Each of them determined, heroic and eventually futile. The defence of Fort Vaux, in the early days of June 1916 is surely one of the more amazing. I have now read three accounts. Each of them has related the remarkable tale of fighting in the corridors of the fort, the struggle of a few against many, but none better than Horne’s (the first penned of the three).

The map of the Verdun battle is clear, and perfectly detailed for consideration of how one might reproduce it on a tabletop.

Horne’s account is complete. In addition to his moving retelling of the story of the battle, mid-way through he includes three chapters of ‘asides’. The first of these relates the impact on the men of the struggle to get supplies to the front, the constant bombardment, casualties incurred without ever seeing the enemy, the lot of the stretcher bearers.

“In one house pulverized by a shell all that remained was a bust of Napoleon, arms folded and facing north as if defying the Germans with its stony glare” (p. 192)

I have tried, unsuccessfully so far, to find a photo of this!

The situation of the battle is contrasted with the home front; another world in which life resumed and even continued unaffected by the war. “Yet, somehow the galleries were open again and doing a brisk trade, and publishers could not remember when they had sold so many books” (p. 194). Horne rounds out his ‘asides’ with a chapter about the air war and another about Crown Prince Wilhelm and why, such a seemingly powerful figure and one who opposed the continuation of the battle was powerless to influence his father; in fact to even get a hearing.

The completeness of the book is reflected well in the final chapters. Third-last of these describes the events from December 1916 to the armistice. The changes in French high command leading to the disastrous ‘Nivelle Offensive’ in which the French armies’ élan was “..raised to fresh heights by Nivelle’s repeated promises that the end of sufferings was close at hand” (p. 321). A false promise, like that to the German army in the initial offensive of Verdun and the British at the Somme, based on hopeful assumptions, trying the same trick twice, ignoring the reaction of the enemy and, worst of all, aimed at the enemy’s strongest point and with “security … even worse neglected than before the Doaumont fiasco the previous May…” (p. 322). The end result was mutiny. Horne takes us briefly through Pétain’s attempts to rebuild army morale, the lasting negative impact on the effectiveness of the French army until the final, co-ordinated ‘all arms’ push of mid-late 1918 and on to the final reoccupation of the Bois des Caures and “… French, American and German troops joined in celebrating the end of the war round a huge bonfire lit on the ‘High Battery’ at Damloup” (p. 325).

This could easily have been the final chapter of the book—and a fitting one it would be—but Horne further rounds out his sublime retelling of the tale with the Aftermath (the reaper’s harvest, post-Verdun careers of key actors, it’s importance in the events of May-June 1940 and a moving and objective retelling of Pétain’s role) followed by an Epilogue of Verdun today and its lasting meaning and message. Let us hope it is heeded and we are not left with the choice “…between Verdun and Dachau” (Jean Dutourd, quoted on page xvi).

Plates in the centre pages contain chiefly contemporary images of the key people involved of events and places

A fabulous photo of the voie sacrée and of an German locomotive

The Verdun 'moonscape'.

It is Horne’s prose that makes this book so good. His use of imaginary and simile, the incorporation of stories of individual combatants (many of whom died after only a short time) along with observations about and quotes from participants all weaved expertly into his retelling.  He informs the reader why things occurred, the emerging ‘strategy’, rather than solely telling us what occurred. Added to this are a couple of excellent maps that have sufficient detail and include all of the places mentioned in the text,and some, chiefly, period photographs of people and places.

The only negative for me, and it is a small one, is Horne’s tendency to attribute generic, popular sociology to the troops of each side and to their actions. Its those generalised, ‘national traits’ that were so popular in the 70s and that so often made their way into the description of troop factors in many of the rule-sets of the time. Human behaviour is far more nuanced and related to circumstance and a heap of other factors. A small one, as I said, and nothing that reduced my score!

This book’s reputation is well-deserved. Little wonder it is considered the 'best version in English’ and has remained in print since 1962, with only the slightest revision. While not easy reading, purely on account of the subject matter, it is one that I shall be returning to again and again.

I am giving it the maximum ten Napoleons—it deserves 11.

Rating

Reference

Horne, A (1993) The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916. First Published 1962. Penguin Press, London. Revised Edition edition. 372 pp.

Further reflections

That is the last of the overall histories of the Battle of Verdun that I plan to read. I will now switch my reading about the battle to specific parts of the whole, to memoirs and to analyses of the strategy, personalities and armies. I have a lot of notes from the three, excellent accounts that I have read so far and Horne’s masterpiece has lead me to further reflections and insights.

- The importance of serendipity in determining events; the actions and decisions of people on the spot and of nature. Things like the doggedness of Driant, the impact of weather on three, crucial occasions and the attacks mounted by the Russians in June.

- The remarkable logistics involved in the build-up for the attack and the fact that the German advance placed pressure on their ability to bring up guns in support.

- Poor command decisions of limited attacks, the secrecy around Falkenhayn’s plans and insufficient resources given to follow-up when most needed.

- Despite this, how close the Germans came to victory after the five days in February but also how far from defeat the French as the German attack was stalled by its own success (not to mention the numerous ‘what-ifs’ around these points including a German attack on both sides of the Meuse, earlier French preparation, French withdrawal to the west bank, Joffre’s preference to abandon Verdun to list but a few).

- Furthermore, how close they came on two further occasions. Around the 12th June when “Nivelle had at hand no more than one fresh brigade in reserve, and there was no indication that the German push had yet exhausted itself. Had the Germans thrust on then, they could almost certainly have broken through to Verdun” (p. 276). Then again later that month (23rd) to the ‘high-water mark (11th July). Yet it was their own side that contributed to their failure by poor communication with the Austrians and the antagonism between Falkenhayn and Conrad resulting in the need to transfer troops east and then, “attacking (once again) on too narrow a front with too few reserves” (p. 291).

- The cost of the loss of Fort Douaumont, not from the German attack but in terms of the numbers to recapture it “…in the estimation of one French divisional commander at Verdun, was to cost France a hundred thousand men” (p 116).

- The difference between preparation and planning. There was plenty of the former but precious little of the latter. Of course, plans have to adapt and adjust to circumstances, but the absence of a grand strategy becomes evident. Perhaps the need to be seen to have one was the reason for Falkenhayn’s bizarre, ex-poste declaration of his strategy to ‘bleed the French white’.

- “Tipperary” being sung by French soldiers as they approached the line. I had not realised that it had been sung by troops of all nations. I learn so much, both big and small.

- The consideration, almost spectre of the Somme offensive, on both sides and its impact on grand strategy, particularly the commitment of additional men and matériel at Verdun.

- The continued slow adaptation of the generals and inability or unwillingness to learn from other fronts, despite successes where they had. When, under increasing pressure to bring it forward, the attack on the Somme was initiated, with the preliminary bombardment brought forward to 24th June “it was Foch’s men—in the van, the famous ‘Iron Corps’, now recovered from its mauling before Verdun in February—who were to mark up the only real success. They worked forward in small groups supported by machine guns, using the land with pronounced tactical skill, in the way they had learned at Verdun, and emulating where possible the German’s own infiltration techniques there. On the first day they overran most of the German first line before getting stuck, and with comparatively light casualties. It was otherwise with the British forces. Led into battle largely by inexperienced generals… trained by generals who believed that what had been good enough for Wellington was good enough for them, commanded by a man who—in his insular contempt for the French Army—felt there was nothing to be gained from its experiences,… advanced in a line that would have earned credit at Dettingen” (pp. 293–294). Of course, the fine example of the French under Foch, or of the sound, detailed planning and execution of the attacks at Verdun in October were not repeated in the disaster of Nivelle’s offensive on the Chemin des Dames of 1917 and his continued ordering attacks against all evidence of their complete failure and futility.

- The critical importance of Verdun. “June 23rd, 1916, represented the climax and crisis of the Battle of Verdun. It was also the turning point in the Great War” (p. 295). As with Vienna 1683, Moscow 1812, Gettysburg 1863 and Coral Sea or Stalingrad 1942 (plus numerous others that readers will think of and know far better than I) it was not a sudden collapse. In fact, the actual ‘high-water mark’ of the attack came on 11th July with a “a dangerous hole in the French front lines, but this time only some 400 yards deep” (p. 299) and even an isolated detachment atop the glacis of Fort Souville who “…could see the twin towers of Verdun cathedral and the Meuse gleaming through the summer haze… The Promised Land! …a sight that would be bestowed on these thirty alone” (p. 299). The battle, and indeed the war, was destined to see plenty of further loss and destruction, Entente failures and German successes until November 1918 (including of course the last-ditch, spring offensive of Operation Michael and Operation George).

- Verdun as a Greek tragedy or plaything of the gods (as was the entire war)—a wargame even, with the 100-foot generals as the gods? The actions of men almost immaterial in comparison to those of the gods (decisions of high command) as they moved the pieces. Highlighted by the battle developing a ‘force of its own’ and of the effects of factors away from Verdun on the availability of ‘resources’ for that battle.

Verdun 105 (7) Miscellaneous update

A bit of slow and steady painting has been happening (in addition to the acquisition, reading and reviewing books), along with a bit of other miscellaneous preparation for 'having a go at Verdun'.

Figures

It doesn't look like much and the figures in the photo below look dark, 'cause they are! They have been undercoated, had basing material applied and their faces, packs and rifles painted (plus a bit more on some of the artillery and 2 mm figures). They should come along quickly now as I move to uniforms, helmets and then finishing touches.

Progressing: French canon de 155 Grande Puissance Filloux (GPF), canon de 105 mle 1913 Schneider and infantry in 1/72 scale (left & centre), plus an army in 2 mm at right.

These 210 mm Mörser 10s are all but completed, requiring only the red piping to the uniforms and red bands to the caps, plus perhaps a couple of touch-ups, and then varnish and plastidip.

Barbed wire

Thanks to a page on the website of Nikolas Lloyd (aka 'Lindybeige') I was introduced to the idea of using car repair mesh for barbed wire. This is easy to do and looks really convincing (to me at least). I am musing as to whether to darken the resulting 'wire' with a bit of a wash, or simply to leave it as is. I'll probably use it as is and then see what it looks like. The shiner finish will likely work better with figures on my western front mud terrain.

Car repair mesh to use as barbed wire, a fantastic idea c/- Nikolas Lloyd at lloydianaspects.

Some coils of barbed wire attached to bases/posts.

Assorted others

A few other things on the go along with this main focus on First World War figures, guns and wire (not to be confused with "Lawyers, guns and money"...) are some Austrians and Poles for Ottoman-Hapsburg wars (and others) of the late 16th and early 17th centuries and some animals and 'early humans' to use to have a go at a game of "Paleo diet: eat or be eaten'" with the grandkids in the coming holidays. These are all really close to completion (having received base-coat, basing and black-wash) and will be getting their finishing touches when I use the required colours on First World War and/or Napoleonic troops.

(At left) Mars figures of Sobieski's Poles and late 16th/early 17th C Austrians.

Figures, men and beasts for 'Paleo Diet'.

 

Book review: The History of Toy Soldiers

My father would have loved this book. It’s full of the model soldiers from his childhood, but so much besides. Such is the extensive history provided by Toiati that Dad’s nostalgia would only have begun a few chapters into the book!

With his aptronymic name Toiati was destined to this. He has produced a sumptuous book that is like an encyclopaedia of toy/model soldiers and their manufacturers down the ages. His descriptions and explanations are written with the knowledge of a master of the subject, but one who has an absolute passion for it.

This ‘encyclopaedia’ is arranged in historical and thematic chapters. The journey begins with four chapters about the history and development of figures from the earliest known toy/model soldiers to the birth of what he calls the ‘modern’ toy soldier—a chapter with plenty of photographs of lovely flats. The remaining 12 chapters are thematic around styles and materials of production, uses or both.

Some of the lovely flats featured in chapter 4

 

Model soldiers in action. This photo of some of Ian (Stryker)'s beautifully painted Hinton Hunt figures is from the only chapter about wargaming.

Toiati is not a wargamer. He has an understanding and even some appreciation of wargaming, but the book is about model soldiers as individual representations or used in their tens or dozens as playthings. There is but one chapter about wargaming*. I would have liked to have seen more photos of figures in ‘action’, hundreds and thousands of model soldiers used to represent history in dioramas or wargames and fewer presentation or cabinet-type photos; but that is the bias of the wargamer^. This is Toiati's book, not mine!

*Reminds me a bit of when Battle Magazine was absorbed into Military Modelling and content of the former was relegated to a few pages, amongst pages and pages of absolutely beautifully painted display figures.

^Mind you, a functional approach to toy/model soldiers was ‘drilled’ into me at a young age. We all played with Dad’s Britains figures, which received quite a bashing in the process, chiefly because he considered that toy soldiers were to be played with, not left in a display cabinet. In his later years he did have a few, selected purchases in such a cabinet, but, of course, we had the less-expensive, wargame figures for ‘active duty’. 

A two-page spread of some of the paper figures featured. I have some like these in an old scrapbook.

While not a toy soldier aficionado nor collector, there is still plenty in the book for the likes of me. There is the nostalgia associated with photographs and descriptions of flats, paper figures, elastolin figures, ‘classic’ wargaming figures and plastic figures. Added to this is the pure joy of seeing so many lovely pictures of beautiful figures, from makers around the world, some battered ‘veterans’ and others with a pristine paint-job. Many of the photos are from the author's collection, some from other collectors and quite a number simply taken from various internet sites (all sources are noted).

Some battered Britains, reminiscent of the look of Dad's old Romans after he and then we three offspring had played with them. (The ones photographed here are a little older though circa 1910).

Britains souvenir figures. The Henry VIII was amongst those that my Dad had.

Airfix French cuirassiers in one of the early boxes; part of the personal nostalgia for me.

A childhood favourite; mine were the Timpo version (currently stored in my wargames room).

Toiati states that he chose to limit his research up to around the year 2000 as his focus is on “…figures already part of history. Today’s figures will have to wait for their turn to be included.” His cut-off is a little earlier than this though as, of the more wargame-related figures, there is a description of Hinton Hunt, Les Higgins, Hinchliffe, Minifigs, Scruby (and so forth), amongst the metal figures, but none of Foundry, Élite, Essex, Front Rank, Dixon, Peter Pig, Warrior, Old Glory or any of the plethora of post-60s–70s manufacturers. In plastic we have Airfix, Matchbox, Atlantic and Esci/Italeri, but no Hat, Strelets, Zvezda and so on.

Nevertheless with its 621 pages packed with beautifully reproduced colour photographs and Toiati’s descriptive text full of interesting details and anecdotes, it’s a book that will naturally appeal to the collector of toy soldiers but also anyone who has had the pleasure of using and enjoying them as children or in adulthood.

Rating

Reference

Toiati, L (2019) The History of Toy Soldiers. Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, England. 621 pp.

Verdun 105 (6) Reflections to date

Now two books and six pages of notes into my detailed reading about Verdun, a few themes and observations are presenting themselves to me.

Douaumont Ossuary and Verdun Memorial (Wikimedia commons)

I have a greater appreciation of the scale and logistics of the battle. I had an idea from reading and viewing histories of the war in its totality, but there is nothing like looking in depth and considering how to represent it to really appreciate these aspects.

The aim German aims. Having always heard it presented as ‘bleed the French white’ it is interesting to discover that there is some doubt about what Falkenhayn had intended in planning the attack. Buckingham refers often to Falkenhayn’s aim of ‘verblutung’. He has been greatly influenced by Foley’s “German strategy and the path to Verdun: Erich Von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916” (which is now on my reading list). Clearly to wear the French down was part of the plan, whether it was the ultimate aim or part of a major ‘diversionary’ attack to distract and to reduce capacity to respond to attack(s) elsewhere on the front. We can never know for sure, given the need for secrecy, verbal-only meetings and knowing that memoirs are written to justify actions. While it seems a strange ‘justification’, I suppose to say that I aimed for 5:1 casualties is a little easier to digest than, I planned a major diversionary attack, when justifying ‘wasting’ the cream of Germany’s military capacity. I look forward to learning more as my ‘study’ progresses. I’ll have to try to get hold of the English translation of Falkenhayn’s memoirs, as well as that of Crown Prince Wilhelm.

Joffre’s vindictive and vengeful nature in moving on anyone who opposed or questioned him or ‘failed’/provided a scapegoat. Perhaps the biggest exception to this was Pétain whom Joffre promoted out of the way due to the former’s standing with army and populace (although, perhaps the rationale of providing Pétain with a greater understanding of the ‘bigger picture’ may have been part of it).

Pétain’s performance to stabilise the front, set-up a system to bring in matériel and to rotate men was quite remarkable—all while suffering from double-pneumonia.

The remarkable heroism, doggedness and stoicism of the soldiers of both sides and the unimaginable effects on the bodies and minds of those involved. 

The sheer numbers of non-combatants involved and logistics of provisioning so many men and horses.

The real attempts by the senior commanders to adapt and to innovate their methods, even if relatively minor and with little effect, mixed with flagrant and repeated use of “flesh against steel” that has given them the terrible reputation for uncaring aloofness to this day.

Having read two more recently written accounts, I will now go back and read the highly rated ‘original’: The Price of Glory by Alistair Horne which was first published in 1962. I have read many comments and reviews rating it as the ‘best version in English’. Both Kaufmann & Kaufmann and Buckingham referred to Horne’s book on numerous occasions. Buckingham in particular was strong influenced by it. I am expecting that the book will live up to expectations as Horne’s Napoleon: Master of Europe is one of my all-time favourites. My expectation that I will agree wholeheartedly with the effusive assessments has increased as I have cheated a bit and pre-read a few pages!

References

Buckingham, WF (2018) Verdun 1916 : the deadliest battle of the First World War. First Published 2016. Amberley Publishing, Merrywalks, Stroud, England. 320 pp.

Foley, RT (2005) German strategy and the path to Verdun: Erich Von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916. Cambridge Military History Series Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 301 pp.

Horne, A (1993) The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916. First Published 1962. Penguin Press, London. Revised Edition edition. 372 pp.

Kaufmann, JE and Kaufmann, HW (2016) Verdun 1916 The Renaissance of the Fortress. Pen & Sword Military (an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd), Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK. 255 pp.

Verdun 105 (5): Book Review "Verdun 1916 The deadliest battle of the First World War"

On reading the first page of this book I was struck with two aspects. Buckingham commences with a wonderfully vivid and descriptive word-picture of the town of Verdun and surrounding geography. This immediately demonstrates the high-degree of readability of the book, thanks to Buckingham's excellent prose, and also the details of the content, so helpful to understanding the battle and providing useful information for wargaming-related activities.

The remainder of the first chapter is a pocket history of Verdun from settlement in 450 BC to the end of the Franco-Prussian war, including developments of the fortifications and the first two significant sieges of 1792 and 1871. The chapter concludes with a brief history of the Franco-Prussian War, setting up a changed France at the end of the 19th century.

The second chapter picks up from end of Franco-Prussian war and how it influenced French military thinking. Initially in construction of a new defensive line, including the camp rétranche de Verdun, at huge expense; up to 60–78 million francs once it had been updated several times in response to changing military technology. He describes how the French were at the forefront of military technology in terms of machine gun, field artillery and aircraft (although not so in heavy artilllery), but were stuck in a former age (revolutionary zeal and Napoleonic glory mixed with post 1829 ‘tradition’) when it came to uniforms (les pantalons garances) and particularly philosophy. His telling of the ‘battle’ over military philosophy and the victory of exponents of the attaque à outrance (including one General Joffre, appointed in July 1911 as chief of staff of the army making him head of the army in peace and supreme commander in time of war) is astounding in hindsight, but also given developments in other nations. Buckingham concludes, in a salutary note “…an operational philosophy tailored to solve the problems of 1870… attaque à outrance and Plan XVII were set to provide an equally updated method of feeding manpower into the maw” (p. 53).

Chapter three: It is war! From the declarations of war to the mobilisation and initial attacks of French troops. I'd not read nor heard perviously the amazing statistic of how hugely successful French mobilisation was in 1914 with only 1.5% (or about 1 600) failing to report (as opposed to the expected 13%). Buckingham praises Joffre’s organisation for this, but I suspect that the bravado of the populace in supporting the war in August 1914 was also a contributing factor. Initial diversionary attacks by the French into Alsace-Lorraine and Ardennes met with some success, but were soon blunted. We learn of the first of the French general’s to suffer from Joffre’s limoges (his tendency to sack generals who were unsuccessful and transfer to Limoges so as to not have disgruntled generals in Paris). The statistics of the first weeks' fighting for the French; 260 000 casualties, 75 000 dead, 27 000 killed on 22 August. The dead included 4 778 officer (1/10th of the army’s officer corps). This was not, however, really related to attaque à outrance or gaudy uniforms as German casualties were similar. Rather it was due to the killing power of rapid firing artillery, rifles and machine guns and the power of defence over attack. In leading us to Verdun, Buckingham describes the bombardment and capture of Fort Manonviller in some detail, the incorrect conclusion of the French that it was destroyed by artillery, when in fact blown up after capture to prevent use by French—was an important lead in to Verdun (an important note that I had also read in "Verdun 1916: renaissance of the fortress"). Having until  now focussed chiefly from French perspective, Buckingham now switches to introduce German plans for war.

He describes the Schlieffen Plan and its implementation by von Moltke and how it contradicted French expectations, thinking and planning. The logistics of the planned movements are astounding, but, of course, it did not quite go according to plan and was adjusted due to needs in the east and revisions of von Moltke. He briefly covers the Battle of The Marne, race to the sea and establishment of the lines of the western front, pointing out that Germans held the most advantageous geography, leading to wasteful French and British attacks in 1915. The exception to this was the Verdun salient. Buckingham goes back to describing its formation along with the Saint-Mihiel salient. The chapter ends with the German destruction of two of the three railways feeding Verdun, leaving a “30-mile long narrow gauge military railway and parallel road running south-west to Bar-le-Duc as its line of communications. This rather tenuous link was to become more vital than its builders could ever have imagined” (p. 80).

In chapter 4 he describes events leading to the Battle of Verdun. Changes at German HQ after the failure of Schlieffen plan, defensive strategy in the west by Falkenhayn to allow attacks in the east. The fruitless French and British attacks in 1915 in attempts to wrest the high ground. This demonstrated clearly the power of the defence and that, while they would not lose war, Germany could not win by defense alone. So we have the development of Falkenhayn’s plans for attack in the west. The choices of Verdun or Belfort. Settling on Verdun. Buckingham describes the planning and logistics of the operation in great detail which, thanks to his fine prose, makes for easy, interesting and impactful reading.

From chapter 5 on Buckingham describes the battle in detail, comencing with the initial Geramn attack of 21–28 February 1916. As with Kaufmann and Kaufmann in "Verdun 1916: renaissance of the fortress", Buckingham provides an overview of the entire front, but he focusses more on the actions of smaller formations with more detail of sections of the battle. This includes units involved down to regiments, battalions and sometimes companies. This is complimentary and helps with the building picture of the battle that I am getting. His details of the unit numbers of men and locations are particularly useful to understanding events but also in planning any sort of re-fight (once again this compliments Kaufmann and Kaufmann which provided insights into the more detached outlook of the C-in-C (wargamer) for whom the lowest level of formation of note is the division).

Above and below, two of the double-pages of plates showing contemporary and modern images of the battlefield.

Buckingham continues this approach over the remaining five chapters, combining a strategic and tactical overview, with detailed descriptions and plenty of eyewitness accounts/recollections. These cover events of 6 March–29 May, the escalation of the attack to include the west bank (chapter 6); 29 April–1 June, attacks on both banks (chapter 7),; 1 June–8 June the German capture of Fort Vaux (chapter 8);  8 June–12 July final German attacks (chapter 9). The book's final chapter describes from the effective end of German offensive operations, the recapture of Fort’s Douaumont and Vaux in October-November 1916 through to the final recapture, in October 1918, of all territory lost in those ‘five days in February’. Along the way Buckingham tells us of the fate of the generals of both sides post-Verdun; the transfer to lesser fronts and eventual fading into obscurity of Falkenhayn, von Knobelsdorf and Joffre, the eventual reconciliation and interment in Les Invalides of Nivelle and Magnin (despite their leading part in the disastrous Battle of Aisne and mutiny of the Chemin des Dames in May-June 1917) and the sad tale of Pétain’s ‘transformation’ from hero and saviour of '16–'18 to villain and scapegoat of '40–'45. He concludes by telling us of the post-war clean-up (or covering) of the battlefield, establishment of memorials, shrines and visitor’s centres and dedication of Verdun as the World Capital of Peace, Freedom and Human Rights by the United Nations.

The anecdotes/recollections and detail in the chapters provides numerous interesting, moving and/or amazing pieces of information for the reader. A few examples will serve to illustrate this point

This from Feldwebel Karl Garner Infanterie  Regiment 243 on 4th March:

All I have told you, dear mother, is false. We have been badly informed by our officers. We are just maintaining our position on the ground we have won after fearful losses and we must give up hope of taking Verdun. The war will continue for an indefinite period, and in the end there will be neither victors nor vanquished (p. 158).

For the bombardment of Fort Vaux, the Germans gathered 2 200 guns, but

…their performance had been severely downgraded by this point because the gun barrels were approaching the limit of their useful life, having had more shells put through them than the manufacturers envisaged (p. 191).

Despite this,

…the intensity of the German preparatory bombardment did much of the assault troop’s work for them. The 28e Régiment d’Infanterie’s 3e Bataillon manning the Ravin de Bazil sector of the front line was virtually wiped out in the course of the night for example, and the unrelenting shelling reduced the 1er Bataillon to just eight men when it attempted to counter-attack the position from the support trench line (p. 192).

The description of the German attack and eventual capture of Fort Vaux in June is particularly engrossing, awe-inspiring. The combat above the fort and in the tunnels was described in some detail by Kaufmann and Kaufmann, but Buckingham dedicates an entire chapter to it and so tells the tale of this horrible and heroic fight in more detail, with numerous quotes. The word-picture is astounding. Men inside the fort, resisting desperately against attackers also in the fort’s interior, others outside and on top, desperately trying to break-through, while repulsing French counter-attacks. The deliberate calling down of ‘friendly fire’ upon the fort so as to try to dislodge or at least to disrupt the attacker s without. Then, the eventual surrender of the beaten but unbroken, wretched and parched survivors of the garrison who were well treated by their captors, despite the latter having suffered some 2 742 casualties in seven days of desperate fighting to wrest the fort from its 300-odd strong garrison (support from Fort Souville and under-manned relief attempts).

 

A final example on the state of the battlefield not long after the capture of Ft Vaux:

… the physical state of the battlefield, which constant shelling had ploughed into a cratered, milky brown desert bereft of foliage or shade. Water was therefore a key requirement but had to be brought forward by hand with the limitations and risk that entailed; only twenty-eight of ninety-five water bearers from the Bayerische Leib Regiment despatched to Fleury during the night of 23/24 June got through, for example (p. 227).

One of the maps in appendix 1, this showing the front lines before the initial German offensive and the firing lines of the German batteries.

Book includes two appendices. The first contains six maps showing the Verdun front, city of Verdun, initial German offensive with locations of gun batteries and firing lines, supply lines of Verdun, area of the initial German attack indicating the front line on each day, and both the east and west banks with German lines in March. All of these maps are clear and sufficiently detailed, but, amazingly, only the map of Verdun has a scale! The second appendix is a listing of the approximate strengths of different levels of formation in each army, from section/platoon to division. 

Each chapter has a large number of notes on the text. These relate chiefly to the sources used which, in Buckingham’s case, are mainly secondary sources. They are well-respected histories all, but nevertheless indicate that he has not returned to archival or other primary sources himself. 

I began by praising Buckingham’s prose. The book is a most readable account. Unfortunately though, some repetition occurs around the middle of the book. I am not sure whether this is proof-reading fatigue, poor editing or related to the deadline of having it published in the centenary year, but it is both annoying and disappointing. For example, on page 174 we read that “… Nivelle and Magnin started as they intended to go on”, only to be told on page 175 that “Nivelle and Magnin had begun as they intended to continue…”. Then, on page 180, regarding the General Magnin's planning of the (failed) French attack to retake Fort Douaumont in May, we learn that Magnin was “…less than impressed when the fort’s [Fort Moulainville] commander, Capitaine Léon Harispe, respectfully pointed out that the 370 mm howitzers were likely to prove inadequate as Moulainville had withstood two weeks of regular bombardment by more powerful German 420 mm pieces without suffering significant damage. Magnin was reportedly less than impressed with the news.” There are a few other examples in the chapter, though mainly words repeated in a sentence so not as bad, and I did not detect such poor proof-reading in any of the other chapters.

Overall, this is a fine book about ‘the infamous western front battle’ (to cite the promo. on the back cover) and one which provides the reader with copious detail and richness in a most readable account. On opening the book I was surprised to see that the chapters began back in ancient times, but it became clearly evident why Buckingham had provided this level of background and it is in fact critical to the reader’s understanding of the epic struggle of 1915.

I borrowed this book courtesy of the State Library service through our ever-helpful local library. I would not have been disappointed in the least had I purchased a copy.

Rating

Reference

Buckingham, WF (2018) Verdun 1916 : the deadliest battle of the First World War. First Published 2016. Amberley Publishing, Merrywalks, Stroud, England. 320 pp.

Verdun 105 (4): German Army

Having painted nearly six hundred figures* in a month, I am pretty chuffed and feeling nearly as productive as Dean at WAB Corner. 

There are a couple of 'minor' differences;

 - mine were 2 mm scale, and

- they are an abstract version compared to Dean's works of art!

 

*The actual count was 598, plus 26 horses, 16 guns & heavy mortars and 17 vehicles.

I really enjoy this tiny scale. It's great fun identifying what is what (glasses a necessity) and trying to bring them out in their best light. Looking at the photos you may well ask why I bothered, but the types are clear enough even to the naked eye and there is some remarkable detail that becomes evident on closer inspection. 

As well as the pleasure, challenge and sense of achievement in painting them, they are fit for purpose—to represent the entire Battle of Verdun in its entirety (and later other, huge battles of the First World War).

Trucks and headquarters: generic models for 'modern' periods

Looking closer at the headquarters (note two officers sitting at desk).

Trucks and a staff car

Machine guns. Clearly identifiable.

Infantry, from the front (stormtroopers at left—a bit of green and brown camo. on helmets).

Infantry from rear. Note the packs.

Cavalry column from the front.

A clearer photo taken under natural light

Above and below: cavalry from the rear under artificial and natural light. Note the leather belts.

 

Above and below: 21 cm mörser in artificial and natural light

Their big brothers. I threw these into the same 'production line'. They need final touch-up and then will be set for the larger-scale representation of sections of Verdun.

Field artillery

Heavy mortars

Trench mortars. Not such good figures in either natural or artificial light, but 'okay' and clearly differentiated.

Probably my favourites of all: the A7Vs and captured MkIVs (beutepanzers). Not for Verdun, of course, but for later battles.

One can try to photograph these figures and models too closely and this large-scale complete army effect is probably a better way to look at them!

It's interesting when the sand grains that I use in my basign mix are almost as big as the figures, but I am happy with the mud effect and smatterings of men and matériel in the mire.

Next is the French army and then I'll put them to the 'test'.